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Revolutionary Papers is a transnational research collaboration exploring 20th century periodicals of Left, anti-imperial and anti-colonial critical production. Read More

Concepts

Jabal circulated subversive, counter-political ideas that reimagined the relationship within Balochistan, and between Balochistan and its mountains with the rest of Pakistan and its cities—as well as internationalist connections with the rest of the world. Against Bhutto’s idea of northeastern, mountainous Balochistan as a site where a “reactionary system” of tribal rule, epitomised especially in the figure of the head or the sardar, “has kept the poor Baluch backward and in chains” 1Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali. 1976. “Abolishing Sardari System,” Prime Minister’s Speech, Quetta, April 8, 1976. Available here. Accessed 8 Sep. 2018., Jabal imagined them as home to an especially autonomous community who with their fellow Baloch elsewhere could lead the country towards a more democratic order.

On the one hand, Jabal stated that “British colonialism and its Pakistani inheritors” had “tried to keep the Baluch atomised and backward so that they could not unite and become a powerful nation known for its bravery and historic resistance to subjugation.” 2Jabbal, March-April 1977, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 6. Mirroring the discourse of the Pakistani nationalist state – of the Baloch as unconnected and behind – they offered another vision of what it could mean to look towards one another, and look forwards towards the future. So, Jabal explained that the Pararis/BPLF sought to “unite” the “people” in Balochistan by giving a “united command, with guerrilla forces for the defence of the people’s rights, lives, and property, and guidance to achieve the long cherished goals of national liberation from the yoke of exploitation and oppression by the fascists.” 3Pararis/Baloch Popular Liberation Front (BPLF). 1977. “Jabbal, March-April 1977, Vol. 1, No. 4,” p. 7. This became especially possible, they argued, because of the war itself: “A new structure, the product of war, is gradually overshadowing the traditional tribal structures.” 4Pararis/Baloch Popular Liberation Front (BPLF). 1977. “Jabbal, January 1977 Vol. 1, No. 2.” On the other hand, central to Jabal and was the belief that the freedom of the Baloch in Pakistan, especially those of its mountains, was mutually dependent on the freedom of other repressed communities inside and outside the country. In order to achieve this freedom, Jabal spoke of how BPLF and other sympathetic movements should create links among themselves within Pakistan as well as other, ongoing armed struggles against colonial and postcolonial repression around the world. So, Jabal’s authors write that the first step “towards true emancipation of the people of Pakistan is the struggle of the minority nationalities for their national and democratic rights coordinated with the democratic and progressive forces  in the Punjab”, i.e. progressives from Pakistan’s most politically and militarily powerful province. 5Jabal, September 1977, Vol. 1, No. 9, p. 1. For this, they drew on the idea of multinationalism, which called for the recognition by the state of multiple languages and national groups. Indeed, Jabal links the fate of Baloch with those of the Bengalis in former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Just two years prior to the launch of Bhutto’s counterinsurgency operation, the Bengalis fought and seceded to create a new country precisely because Bhutto and the Pakistan Army had refused to recognise Bengali language and identity as integral to a more multinational idea of Pakistan. The view of Jabal’s authors reflected that of the founder of the Pararis, the group that eventually renamed itself as the BPLF, namely Sher Mohammad Marri. Indeed, in an interview, Sher Mohammad Marri argued that “the power structure in Pakistan could be overturned only if other minorities joined the Baluch in waging simultaneous and coordinated armed struggles to win their demands for regional autonomy.” 6Quoted in Harrison 1981, 72. He was convinced that it was the only way to pluralise a state that was so dominated by “Punjabi capitalists” 7Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad (London), p. 38. and those who worked with them, whether they were “Punjabi, Sindhi or Baluchi [sic.].” 7Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad (London), p. 38. “Pakistan,” he was convinced, “is a country of several nationalities. Communism is the only solution for the structure of a state which has a plurality of nationalities.” 7Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad (London), p. 38.

Pakistan is inhabited by several nationalities. The country will only begin to prosper when there is interdependence and unity among them. But this unity cannot be realised until all Pakistanis feel that they are equal and no one should rob them of their fundamental human rights. A Communist society will end that exploitation which is the primary cause of mutual hatred among the people. Our rulers are trying to split the masses so that they can continue their malpractices and exploitation. The responsibility for the mutual hatred among the immigrants, Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pathans falls on our selfish leaders and the decadent system under which Pakistan is being run.”
— Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad, London, 39.

For Sher Mohammad Marri, it was this call for unity, and communism, that set the Pararis/BPLF apart from other “bourgeois [nationalist] movement[s]” like that “Sheikh Mujib in Bengal.” 10Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad (London, 39. His members, in Pararis/BPLF’s bulletin, Jabbal, declared that it was this sort of united front that would give “renewed hope to all the peoples of Baluchistan and Pakistan that there IS an alternative to the Bhutto-Tikka regime; that there is an alternative to the government of the bureaucratic-bourgeoise and feudalists; that there is an alternative to the dependence on Imperialism … and [for] the oppressed nationalities of Pakistan.” 11Pararis/Baloch Popular Liberation Front (BPLF). 1977. “Jabbal, December 1976, Vol 1, No. 1.” Indeed, as one non-Baloch leftist who briefly worked with the Pararis/BPLF, observes, many of these relations already existed: “We had Marri areas mostly surrounded by Pashtuns in the north. And we had very close relations, and good relations. They didn’t necessarily fight with us, but they helped us especially with supplies and food and stuff like that. So there was none of the sort of tension that exists today, there was much closer cooperation between the Baloch.” 12Interview with Ahmed Rashid, 30 June, 2016, Lahore.

This attempt to link repressed nations internal to Pakistan with one another against a repressive regime was mirrored with a commitment to link themselves to external nations, internationally, facing a common enemy. At one point Jabal declares: “The national and democratic struggle of every people forms part of the International revolution and needs the cooperation of other fraternal revolutionary movements which may develop into direct cooperation at some stage.” 13Jabal, March 1978, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 4. So at the time Jabal was circulating, Baloch from southern Balochistan were being recruited into the Omani army to fight the Dhofar Rebellion, a move heavily criticised by Jabal (“… an effort is being made to turn the sentiments of the revolutionaries of Dhofar and the Middle East against the historical struggle of the people of Balochistan by using these men as hired soldiers against the Dhofar and Arab freedom fighters. In this way they hope to prevent the establishment of links between these movements and the liberation struggle of the people of Balochistan.”) 14Jabal, March 1978, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 4.0 As a result, Jabal articulated an alternative idea of internationalism to that of the pursed by the state, through diplomatic and military channels. Against the state’s pursuit of linkages between state officials and militaries, Jabal called for forging direct links between struggles. So, they criticised the many “… officers of the Pakistan army [who] have served reactionary governments in Oman-Dhofar, Jordan, Kuwait, UAE, etc.” 15Jabal, June 1977, Vol. 1, No. 6, p. 7. Against these links, which they identified as serving only the interests of the “ruling clique” 16Jabal, March 1978, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 4., they declared: “The day is not far when the revolutionary forces will succeed in making them understand that the Baloch and Arab people are united in their struggle against oppression.” 16Jabal, March 1978, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 4. Such solidarity with the Dhofar rebellion is not the only instance of the BPLF expressing direct solidarity with movements, rather than states: In 1970, a small contingent of BPLF fighters went to train with George Habash and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

In other words, Jabal saw an internal battle for a more democratic and pluralist, multinationalist dispensation (one that gave all minoritised groups within the new postcolonial state an equal stake in power) as inextricably linked to a more democratic and pluralist, internationalist dispensation around the world. This call for a unified armed front–among the Baloch and between the Baloch and others–for the purposes of a general insurrection was not just ideological but also a pragmatic political position. Balochistan’s small population in a heavily strategic territory prompted the Pararis/BPLF to conclude that if they went for separation they believed they would come under one or the other power bloc, exacerbating rather than ameliorating their situation. At the same time, they concluded that the Pakistani state they were fighting – which they found to be a “reactionary, military-bureaucratic dictatorship which protects and promotes the interests of the landlord and bourgeois classes” – only existed because of foreign support.

Without Imperialism’s direct and indirect assistance it is difficult to imagine the continued existence of the essentially neo-colonial state of Pakistan in its present condition. Imperialism and the oligarchy are united on the issue of maintaining the most backward and reactionary social structures, maintaining the centuries old rule of the landlords over the peasantry, and oppressing the minority nationalities. Imperialism is the counter-revolutionary prop of all that is most backward and reactionary in our society and impedes its historical development by maintaining the structure of metropolitan dependence and internal exploitative class relations. Even capitalism in our country develops partially, lopsidedly, unevenly and as a dependent adjunct of the world capitalist economy.”
— Jabbal, February 1977 Vol. 1, No. 3,” p. 5

In other words, vertical alliances with “Imperialism” were alliances engaged in by the state that they were fighting; against those sorts of alliances, the Pararis/BPLF sought horizontal alliances between struggles inside and outside Pakistan.

We don’t want tanks, we don’t want aeroplanes, we don’t want massive, gigantic guns. What we need are small, almost imperceptible things. […We] do want help from friends, small help for a big cause, for a noble cause. We are inspired by the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people that triumphed in the face of more stupendous odds. We are inspired by the great struggle of the Palestinians. We are inspired by the triumphant struggle of the African people, the most recent victorious struggle of the Angolan people. We know we can win, because we know how to fight, because we have now a clear goal, because we have a nation behind our struggle, because our struggle is for a noble, righteous cause–for freedom, liberty, peace, democracy and socialism. … We need help from friends. We are fully aware that our friends have their own considerations and limitations to go by and the international implications involved. That is why we say that our needs are simple and limited and can be met without attracting attention. We know how to make the best use of them without involving or implicating our friends.”
— Jabal 1976. “The People’s Armed Struggle in Baluchistan: A Short Review with a Special Emphasis on the Future.”
  1. Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali. 1976. “Abolishing Sardari System,” Prime Minister’s Speech, Quetta, April 8, 1976. Available here. Accessed 8 Sep. 2018.→
  2. Jabbal, March-April 1977, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 6.→
  3. Pararis/Baloch Popular Liberation Front (BPLF). 1977. “Jabbal, March-April 1977, Vol. 1, No. 4,” p. 7.→
  4. Pararis/Baloch Popular Liberation Front (BPLF). 1977. “Jabbal, January 1977 Vol. 1, No. 2.”→
  5. Jabal, September 1977, Vol. 1, No. 9, p. 1.→
  6. Quoted in Harrison 1981, 72.→
  7. Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad (London), p. 38.→
  8. Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad (London), p. 38.→
  9. Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad (London), p. 38.→
  10. Interview in Pakistan Forum, May-June 1973, pp. 38-39. Translation of original Urdu interview by Ahmed Shuja in October 1972, first half published in Urdu in Jid-o-Jahad (London, 39.→
  11. Pararis/Baloch Popular Liberation Front (BPLF). 1977. “Jabbal, December 1976, Vol 1, No. 1.”→
  12. Interview with Ahmed Rashid, 30 June, 2016, Lahore.→
  13. Jabal, March 1978, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 4.→
  14. Jabal, March 1978, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 4.0→
  15. Jabal, June 1977, Vol. 1, No. 6, p. 7.→
  16. Jabal, March 1978, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 4.→
  17. Jabal, March 1978, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 4.→